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Some Skepticism about Criminal
Discovery Empiricism
Miriam H. Baer*
Abstract
This Response addresses Jenia Turner and Alison Redlich’s
comparative analysis of criminal discovery practices in two
neighboring states, Virginia and North Carolina. Whereas
Virginia adheres to the traditional, category-driven approach,
North Carolina requires its prosecutors to disclose the contents of
their “file,” with some notable exceptions.
Open-file discovery has quickly become a fertile source of
debate among scholars and practitioners. Turner and Redlich
have devised a valuable survey to test theoretical claims commonly
asserted by open-file discovery’s opponents and supporters.
Unsurprisingly, the authors find that disclosure is generally
broader in North Carolina (an open-file state) than in Virginia.
More notable is the fact that the North Carolina prosecutors who
answer the survey seem less opposed to open-file discovery than
their Virginia counterparts.
Those who favor the expansion of open-file discovery will find
ample cause for celebration in several, but not all, of Turner and
Redlich’s findings. In this Response, I express my own
reservations, which rest partially on standard concerns with
survey data, as well as the fact that some of open-file’s state level
success may rely upon the availability of an entirely different
criminal justice system (i.e., the federal system) for complex
investigations and prosecutions.
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I. Introduction
As criminal discovery reform proceeds apace, Jenia Ioncheva
Turner and Allison Redlich have wisely taken advantage of the
opportunity to compare and contrast criminal discovery practices
in neighboring states.1 Their Article reports on a survey they
administered to prosecutors and defense lawyers in North
Carolina and Virginia. The contrast between the two states’
criminal discovery practices could not be more different: North
Carolina employs “open file” discovery, whereby prosecutors
disclose nearly all of the contents of their file, minus evidence
subject to a judicial protective order; Virginia adheres to the more
restrictive traditional regime that mandates disclosure of only
certain well-defined categories of evidence, plus evidence falling
within the confines of the Supreme Court’s Brady progeny.2
Turner and Redlich advance the criminal discovery debate in
two ways. First, they focus attention on pre-plea discovery
practices, which is highly welcome given the prevalence of guilty
pleas throughout our criminal justice system. Second, they
employ a survey-based empirical approach that has been largely
missing in this debate.3
1. Jenia Ioncheva Turner & Allison Redlich, Two Models of Pre-Plea
Discovery in Criminal Cases: An Empirical Comparison, 73 WASH & LEE L. REV.
285 (2016).
2. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (obligating prosecution
to hand over “evidence favorable to the accused”); see generally Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (enlarging Brady to include impeachment evidence
for witnesses). As Turner and Redlich point out, in states employing the
categorical or “closed file” approach, defense attorneys are dependent on
prosecutors to determine, in the first instance, what is and is not exculpatory.
Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 300.
3. I am among those who have lodged theoretical concerns with open file
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Based on their survey responses, Turner and Redlich find
that disclosures do in fact increase under an open-file system,
albeit not for all categories of evidence.4 They also find that openfile’s alleged drawbacks—increased threats to witness safety,
fabrication of evidence by the defense, and additional cost—do not
figure prominently in the answers supplied by the North Carolina
prosecutors who answered the survey.5 Accordingly, most
readers—particularly those inclined towards broader discovery
reform—will eagerly cite Turner and Redlich’s results as grounds
for open-file’s expansion to other states and to the federal system,
which stubbornly adheres to the categorical or “closed-file”
approach.6
In this Response, I sound a note of skepticism. Surveys allow
us to home in on issues deserving closer analysis, and Turner and
Redlich’s study may prove most useful in illuminating the factors
that best predict open-file’s success. As the authors themselves
point out, what a relatively small sample of surveyed prosecutors
and defense attorneys say about discovery does not necessarily
reflect the actual state of events.7 Moreover, that open-file
systems work as well as they do in North Carolina (or, more
accurately, in the specific jurisdictions in which prosecutors
answered the survey) tells us little about how well they would
work if they became a universal default.
I flesh out a few of these thoughts in detail below and then
return to the broader question raised by Turner and Redlich’s

discovery. See Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 119 COLUMBIA L. REV 1, 56–57
(2015) (analyzing risks to ongoing investigations and witnesses).
4. See Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 294, 296 (noting open-file’s
limited success with impeachment evidence and evidence possessed by
investigating agencies).
5. See id. at 296–97, 354–55 (finding that North Carolina prosecutors
have not made much effort to evade their discovery obligations and that they
appear less concerned than the Virginia prosecutors with the open-file’s
purported drawbacks).
6. Turner and Redlich identify seventeen states that employ open-file
discovery; ten that, along with the federal government, employ the closed-file
approach; and another twenty-three whose practices “fall somewhere in the
middle.” Id. at 303–05.
7. See id. at 374 (acknowledging that survey tests perception and not
actual practices).
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study, which is how we can best use empirical data to inform
criminal justice reform.
II. The Findings
Turner and Redlich survey prosecutors and defense attorneys
throughout North Carolina and Virginia, asking a mix of tailored
and open-ended questions regarding discovery practices in their
respective states.8 Unsurprisingly, defense attorneys in North
Carolina, an open-file state, report receiving more evidence from
prosecutors than their counterparts in Virginia, particularly for
certain categories of evidence.9 The authors highlight three
additional findings. First, prosecutors and defense attorneys in
both states maintain divergent views of how much evidence they
disclose or receive.10 That is, on average, prosecutors imagine
themselves handing over more evidence and defense attorneys
perceive themselves receiving less evidence.11 Surprisingly, the
degree of the variance persists across states, even though the
baselines for reported discovery improve for most categories in
North Carolina,12 and North Carolina’s defense attorneys are
generally happier with their state’s discovery system than their
8. See id. at 317–22 (describing survey methodology).
9. “We find that statutorily mandated open-file discovery results in
broader disclosure of almost all types of evidence . . . .” Id at 325; see also id. at
323 (summarizing Virginia and North Carolina prosecutors’ discovery practices).
10. This may highlight a conceptual difficulty with the survey itself, which
asks prosecutors what they disclose and defense attorneys what they receive
from prosecutors. “Prosecutors reported on their own behaviors, whereas
defenders reported on their experiences with prosecutors.” Id. at 322. Whereas
the prosecutor’s answer incorporates the existence or nonexistence of a
particular type of evidence (e.g., the prosecutor’s knowledge of how often she
encounters a particular type of evidence and hands it over), the defense
attorney’s answer reflects his own experience and any assumptions he holds as
to nondisclosure and whether such evidence is truly “present” but nevertheless
not disclosed. See id. at 324 (setting forth the survey question’s language to
defense attorneys).
11. “[D]efense attorneys from both [states] stated that they received
evidence much less frequently than prosecutors from the respective jurisdiction
indicated that they provided such evidence.” Id. at 327.
12. See id. at 328–29 (comparing disclosure practices as perceived by
prosecutors and defense attorneys in both states). As the authors later point out,
the perception gap narrows in North Carolina, but that narrowing is
statistically significant for only a few categories. Id. at 385.
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Virginia counterparts.13 Second, the traditional arguments
against open-file discovery—that it might threaten the integrity
of one or more related cases; undermine witness safety and
therefore depress witness cooperation; or significantly burden
state prosecutors—are articulated more often by the Virginia
prosecutors (who enjoy a closed-file regime but sometimes
voluntarily hand over the contents of their file), than the North
Carolina prosecutors who actually work within the confines of an
open-file regime.14 Finally, North Carolina prosecutors
apparently do not attempt to subvert their obligations by
negotiating away discovery rights with discovery waivers.15
In sum, although it is no panacea, North Carolina’s open-file
discovery regime delivers on a number of its promised benefits
while also avoiding the worst of its feared drawbacks. If what the
authors find is true, one ought to enthusiastically embrace the
more generous disclosure regime since it makes defendants and
their attorneys better off without making any other party to the
criminal justice system worse off.16
III. Reasons for Skepticism
The extent to which survey data should impact criminal
justice policy decisions lies beyond the scope of this short
response. Nevertheless, even if one accepts surveys as valuable
empirical data, one might exhibit particular caution in regard to
this survey for the following reasons.

13. Id. at 354.
14. Id. at 358.
15. Id. at 349–50. Then again, even if they did, the negotiation itself would
not be anathema if it resulted in benefits to criminal defendants (i.e., lighter
sentences for crimes actually committed). In any event, one wonders if waivers
are more common throughout larger prosecutors’ offices or among prosecutors
who pursue more complex cases.
16. Although the authors discuss open-file’s presumptive “efficiency,” they
do not distinguish between stronger and weaker theories of efficiency. A policy
is Pareto optimal if it makes one person better off without making anyone else
worse off. It satisfies Kaldor-Hicks efficiency if the gains enjoyed by some
outweigh the losses suffered by others. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 47 (5th ed. 2008) (describing difference between the two
concepts).
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A. Selection Bias.

Turner and Redlich duly acknowledge and explore several
variants of selection bias, including the relatively small sample
size.17 One wishes, however, that they focused even more time
analyzing the differences in responses they received from the
wide variety of prosecutor’s offices and defense attorneys who
received their survey. 18
In Virginia, the “closed file” state, only 24% of the
prosecutors who received the survey began filling it out, and even
fewer completed it.19 (For the sake of clarity, I compare only the
initial commencement rate for each group of respondents.) The
rate was slightly worse for North Carolina, where only 19% of the
prosecutors who received the survey began to answer it.20 Very
few district attorney offices in either state cooperated directly
with the researchers, and the ones that did tended to be small
and located in rural areas.21 Accordingly, the prosecutors in either
state most likely to have intimate knowledge of the witnessrelated difficulties under an open-file regime (i.e., prosecutors of
complex, interconnected cases working out of large offices in
urban areas) very likely did not participate in the study at all.22
The response from publicly funded defense attorneys—in
Virginia only—was notably more robust. Of the Virginia public
defenders that Redlich and Turner solicited, nearly 74% began
filling out the survey, although far fewer completed it.23 In other
words, Virginia’s public defenders began filling out the survey
17. See, e.g., Turner & Redlich, supra note 1 at 327–28 (hypothesizing that
the prosecutors who answered the survey may be more inclined towards
voluntary disclosure and the defense attorneys who answered may be more
frustrated, on average, with the criminal justice system). The authors return to
the discussion of selection bias towards the end of the piece. Id. at 372–74.
18. Turner and Redlich concede that their sample is “non-representative”
insofar as attorneys self-selected to answer the survey. Id. at 321.
19. Id. at 317.
20. Id. at 318.
21. Id.
22. The authors contend that they find no correlation between the
respondents’ caseloads or types of cases prosecuted and the “frequency of
discovery.” Id. at 373. That may be so, but one cannot help but wonder if the
overall sample was skewed against such cases, particularly with regard to
prosecutors’ offices.
23. Id. at 318.
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three times as often as their adversaries.24 Meanwhile, in North
Carolina, public defense attorneys participated in about the same
numbers as their adversaries, with 22.5% of those solicited
beginning the survey.25
Thus, we have a highly lopsided response rate in the state
resisting open-file discovery and a uniformly low response rate in
the one that already enjoys it. Surely, the skewed nature of this
response says something about how the survey’s recipients
interpreted the survey’s purpose. For example, one might infer
that Virginia’s publicly employed attorneys perceived the survey
as part of a larger reform agenda. This would not have been
unreasonable; at the time of the survey’s administration, openfile discovery was the subject of “intense debate” in Virginia.26
Thus, it is at least possible that Virginia’s respondents either
shaded their answers (consciously or subconsciously) or, more
problematic for Turner and Redlich’s study, rejected the survey
out of hand. If that is the case, the selection bias inherent in the
study’s results is potentially more complex than the authors
already acknowledge. One way to overcome it, if possible, might
be to administer the same study in states where discovery reform
has been less salient and compare results.
B. Status Quo Bias.
The well-known status quo bias creates additional reason for
skepticism. If attorneys perceived the survey as a referendum on
the status quo in their particular state, it might have yielded
answers—in North Carolina as well as Virginia—that favored the
rule actually in place, regardless of the content of that rule.
One of the authors’ most notable findings was that North
Carolina prosecutors exhibit neutral and even positive views
24. It would be interesting to know whether the prosecutors or defense
attorneys discussed the survey questions or their answers with each other in
advance of filling it out.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 337. Turner and Redlich suggest that because their survey was
distributed while debate in Virginia was ongoing, it may have caused Virginia’s
prosecutors to alter their responses to show strong adherence to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland. Id. But it is equally plausible that the
discovery debate skewed responses in many other ways, including the one I
raise in the text above.
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regarding their state’s open-file discovery regime.27 Open-file
discovery has been the rule in North Carolina since 2004.28 The
North Carolina prosecutors who completed the survey had
practiced, on average, a little less than 4 years,29 with an upper
and lower bound of 15 and 5 years respectively.30 Thus, most of
the North Carolina prosecutors who answered the survey had
either no experience with or only the faintest memory of the
previous system.
According to behavioral psychology, individuals generally
prefer the status quo for both rational and idiosyncratic
reasons.31 Change ushers in uncertainty and transition costs. It is
particularly unnerving to those who are risk averse. For career
prosecutors working in a small, local office with a fairly constant
case load and relatively predictable plea rate, the costs of
changing course loom fairly high, even when the existing rule is
technically less prosecutor-friendly than a neighboring state’s
alternative.32
For these reasons, we should not be quite so surprised that
the North Carolina prosecutors describe their own state’s system
in either a neutral or positive light, or seem willing to live with
open-file’s drawbacks, provided they receive reciprocal discovery
27. The North Carolina prosecutors advanced more positive comments
about open-file discovery than their Virginia counterparts. The comparisons are
not “apple to apple” comparisons, as the North Carolina attorneys were
discussing a system in existence, whereas the Virginia prosecutors were
describing issues associated with either a hypothetical system or problems that
had previously arisen when the prosecutor voluntarily handed over her file. Id.
at 362, 365–69.
28. Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 305.
29. Id. at 320.
30. Id. at 319.
31. See generally William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo
Bias in Decision-Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 33 (1988) (articulating
rational and bias-supported reasons for adhering to status quo).
32. For a technical discussion with regard to judicially created rules, see
Robert L. Scharff & Francesco Parisi, The Role of Status Quo Bias and Bayesian
Learning in the Creation of New Legal Rights, 3 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 25, 26
(2006). Loss aversion and prospect theory adds an additional gloss: Virginia’s
prosecutors may fear “losing” a closed file system more than North Carolina’s
prosecutors would be “willing to pay” politically for abandoning their open-file
status quo. See, e.g., Eyal Zamir, Loss Aversion and the Law, 65 VAND. L. REV.
829, 835 (2012) (explaining the concept whereby “people attach greater value to
things they already have than to things they have yet to acquire”).
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from the defense.33 It may well be the case that open-file
discovery’s opponents have over-emphasized its drawbacks and
that most prosecutors can adjust to a broader discovery regime
with little or no cost. But it is also plausible that the North
Carolina prosecutors who answered the survey are loath to
abandon the only system they know.
C. Variation and the “Going Federal” Question.
Finally, the strongest reason for skepticism is what I refer to
here as the “going federal” question. Within each state, an
entirely separate federal criminal justice system carries on,
employing its own practices and procedures.34 As the authors
point out, federal criminal discovery stubbornly adheres to the
categorical, closed-file approach.35 It does not mandate
widespread production of inculpatory evidence, other than the
defendant’s own statements and any recordings or documents the
government intends to use in its case in chief.36 Thus, a crime
prosecuted in a federal jurisdiction in North Carolina will involve
far less pre-plea discovery than a similar case prosecuted in state
court.
Some crimes arise solely within their respective state or
federal systems. Federal prosecutors lack jurisdiction over most
thefts and vehicular violations, and a local prosecutor ordinarily
plays no role in the prosecution of the nation’s securities or
immigration laws.37 Notwithstanding these distinctions, there
still exist a number of crimes that fall comfortably within either
33. One ought not to overemphasize this positivity. The North Carolina
respondents certainly had some negative things to say about open-file discovery.
Id. at 362–63. Moreover, like their Virginia counterparts, they eagerly pressed
for reciprocal defense discovery. Id. at 363.
34. See generally Baer, supra note 3, at 56 (raising question regarding
implications of state-level discovery reform for federalization of crimes).
35. Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 305.
36. See Baer, supra note 3, at 44 (critiquing Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Discovery).
37. There are some notable exceptions. New York State’s Martin Act
permits state and local prosecutors to pursue securities frauds. For a discussion
of how Eliot Spitzer used (or abused) this power, see generally Kulbir Walha &
Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against Corporate Malfeasance or
a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot Spitzer and
Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111 (2005).
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prosecutor’s wheelhouse, such as narcotics trafficking, firearm
offenses, and certain robberies.38 Federal and state authorities
can either compete for criminal prosecutions or cooperate by
shifting certain types of cases from one jurisdiction to another.39
Historically, the most notable shifts have been in the direction of
federal jurisdiction.40 Cases that would otherwise be prosecuted
in state court “go federal” for any number of reasons, but the
most prominent among them have been better resources,
government-friendly criminal procedure doctrines, and more
severe punishment.41
When discovery systems are identical across federal and
state jurisdictions, disclosure considerations play no role in the
“going federal” determination. When, however, a state adopts a
notably generous discovery regime, the calculus—at least
theoretically—changes. Cases that local prosecutors would have
eagerly prosecuted become more burdensome—at least on the
margin.42 If the marginal burden is costly enough, and additional
resources are not forthcoming, rational local prosecutors will
38. “In the United States, various federal and state, criminal and civil
enforcement authorities often share overlapping authority over the same
conduct.” Jay Holtmeier, Cross-Border Corruption Enforcement: A Case for
Measured Coordination Among Multiple Enforcement Authorities, 84 FORDHAM
L. REV. 493, 520 (2015).
39. For an extremely helpful introduction to this “codependent”
relationship, see Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent
Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME & JUST. 377, 379 (2006).
40. “[W]ith rare exceptions, the courts have acceded to the federal
government’s authority in this area in the face of federalism-based challenges.”
Lauren M. Ouziel, Legitimacy and Federal Criminal Enforcement Power, 123
YALE L.J. 2236, 2245 (2014).
41. See id. at 2247
[F]ederal sentences for gun and drug crimes are in most instances
harsher and less malleable than their state counterparts; federal
rules of criminal procedure are generally more favorable to
prosecutors; and federal prosecutors have vastly more resources to
devote to each case, as well as the luxury of choosing which cases they
will bring.
Ouziel contends that an additional factor—the federal system’s legitimacy—
rounds out this list. See id. at 2268–78.
42. “For crimes that can be charged interchangeably under federal or state
law, prosecutors can proceed in federal court, thereby protecting sensitive
information such as the identities of witnesses, cooperating defendants, or
connections with ongoing investigations and related cases.” Baer, supra note 3,
at 56.
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yield cases to their federal counterparts, through either a formal
program or task force, or by way of quiet agreement or custom
known primarily to insiders.
One way to determine if this phenomenon exists would be to
analyze the United States Sentencing Guidelines, both on a
comparative level and longitudinally, with attention paid to the
size of the respective United States Attorneys’ offices populating
each state, the types of cases they pursue and the median offense
level assigned to an offender for a given category of crime. This
would be no easy undertaking, but it might flesh out some of the
concerns raised in this Response.43
If the “going federal” phenomenon is real, it creates a
conundrum for open-file discovery’s proponents. When discovery
regimes such as North Carolina’s appear to function well, we
naturally support their expansion. North Carolina’s success,
however, may be partially dependent on the presence of a federal
escape valve. If this is the case, expansion of open-file at the state
level may well make some defendants worse off, since some
individuals who would have been prosecuted by state authorities
now find themselves subject to a harsher and often more powerful
sovereign.44 The reply to this concern might be to universalize
open-file across all jurisdictions, state and federal. If we go down
this road, however, we must acknowledge the strain an open-file
system might place on the distinctly different cases that arise
almost exclusively within the federal system, such as white-collar
frauds, complex organized crime, and terrorism prosecutions.45
IV. Why Criminal Discovery Empiricism Matters
To what extent should criminal discovery empiricism inform
criminal discovery policy? The question seems like a no-brainer at
first. Why theorize a criminal discovery system’s costs and
43. There might be additional value in surveying federal and state
prosecutors and defense attorneys in states where the federal discovery rule
differs significantly from the state one.
44. Id. at 57.
45. Although Turner and Redlich find no correlation between the frequency
of discovery and the types of cases involved, it is quite possible their survey
failed to capture the offices and/or cases most likely experience discovery issues.
Turner & Redlich, supra note 1, at 373.
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benefits when neighboring states provide such a rich and
valuable laboratory for comparison?
But just as theory has its limits, so to does empiricism, in
part because the strongest arguments for open-file discovery may
be grounded in notions of fairness and not social welfare. If you
believe, as a matter of principle, that the information that
potentially deprives an individual of his or her freedom should be
freely accessible, well in advance of a trial or guilty plea, then it
is questionable how bothered you should be by the added costs
this imposes on the state. Due process is not cheap.
If, however, you intend to argue that mandatory open-file
disclosure improves social welfare by reducing wrongful
convictions, eliminating costly litigation, and enabling quicker
and more informed plea decisions, then you need an empirical
basis with which to back up those claims.46 This is particularly
true if your aim is to convince cost-conscious legislators and the
public they serve that open-file discovery is a “win-win” policy,
one that leaves crime rates low and disposition rates high.
It is thus a positive development that scholars are
investigating the distinctions in discovery practices between
different states, as well as the on-the-ground perceptions of
criminal defense attorneys and prosecutors. One hopes that
Turner and Redlich will continue along this path, perhaps with a
focus on different states, different systems, and other sources of
data. One hopes as well that other scholars will jump into the
fray, utilizing additional empirical methods to measure open-file
discovery’s effect on criminal justice. Many of us already harbor
preliminary intuitions regarding the fairness question. Before we
decide the efficiency debate, however, we need to ask many more
questions.

46. See id. at 307 (articulating efficiency arguments advanced in favor of
open-file discovery).

